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AN OPEN INFINITE FUTURE IS IMPOSSIBLE
Alexander R. Pruss
According to the Open Futurist there are no true undetermined contingent 
propositions about the future. I shall argue on probabilistic grounds that 
there are some statements about infinite futures that Open Futurism cannot 
handle. The Open Futurist’s best bet is to reject an infinite future, but a Chris-
tian philosopher cannot take that bet, and hence should reject Open Futurism.
1. Probability and an Open Future
According to the Open Futurist, there are no true future contingent propo-
sitions of the form: “It will be the case that p,” where its being the case 
that p is not logically determined by the present state of the world. Either 
all such statements are false or they all lack truth value. I shall argue on 
the grounds of probability theory that there are certain statements about 
infinite futures that Open Futurism cannot handle. The Open Futurist’s 
best bet would be to reject the possibility of an infinite future, but I argue 
that the Christian Open Futurist cannot take that bet, as humanity’s hope 
lies in an everlasting heavenly joy. Thus the Christian philosopher should 
reject Open Futurism.
Before considering the main argument, let’s think about a simpler prob-
abilistic argument against Open Futurism. Suppose that I am determined 
by the present conditions and laws of nature to flip an indeterministic fair 
coin in exactly five minutes. According to Open Future views, it is neither 
true that the coin will land heads nor that it will fail to land heads (either 
both statements are false or neither statement has a truth value). Yet by 
definition of fairness, the probability that the coin will land heads is 1/2. 
So the Open Futurist has to believe both that it is not true that the coin will 
land heads and that the probability that it will land heads is 1/2. Yet surely 
if one believes that it is not true that the coin will land heads, one assigns 
a probability less than 1/2 to the proposition. We can make the problem 
sharper by supposing the coin to be unfair and to have a probability 9/10 of 
landing heads. Then the Open Futurist has to believe both that it is not true 
that the coin will land heads and that it has a probability 9/10 of doing so.1
These claims are uncomfortable, but perhaps an Open Futurist can live 
with them. The Open Futurist can, for instance, say that there is a tenseless 
1This is a variant on the argument of Pruss, “Probability and the Open Future View.”
pp. 461–464 FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY Vol. 33 No. 4 October 2016
doi: 10.5840/faithphil201610566
All rights reserved
462 Faith and Philosophy
proposition, u, that the coin lands heads at t5, where t5 is five minutes from 
now. The sentence “The coin will land heads in five minutes” can be said 
to have u as its “tenseless content” (no claim is made that the tenseless 
content exhausts the meaning of the sentence). Then the probability that 
the coin will land heads in five minutes is r because u has a chance of 
degree r to become true.2 In other words, claims about the probabilities of 
future contingents are claims about the chances-to-become-true of tense-
less propositions that are at present neither true nor false.3
2. Probability and an Infinite Open Future
But there is a more serious problem for the Open Futurist. Imagine a 
possible world with a finite past and an infinite future where the laws 
of nature and initial conditions determine that (a) the past is finite, (b) 
the future is infinite and (c) every day an indeterministic and fair coin is 
tossed. Let q be the proposition that the coin lands heads infinitely many 
times. The Law of Large Numbers4 implies that with probability 1, the 
limiting frequency of heads in the coin’s tosses is 1/2. Since there will be 
infinitely many tosses, if the limiting frequency of heads is 1/2, there must 
be infinitely many heads. Hence, the probability of q is one.
Now, some may cavil that the probability of q is 1 minus an infinitesimal 
rather than 1, since there is an infinitesimal chance that the coin will, say, 
always land tails.5 Either way, it is clear that the probability of q is nearly 1, 
a term I will stipulatively use to mean either 1 or 1 minus an infinitesimal.
But the Open Futurist has a problem here. Her theory commits her not 
only to the claim that q isn’t true, but also to the claim that q never becomes 
true. For there is always a causal possibility that there will be only finitely 
many heads. And yet q has a probability of nearly 1. How can one believe 
that a proposition with probability nearly 1 is neither true nor becomes 
true?
We can make the problem sharper. Let q* be the proposition that an 
indeterministic and fair coin is tossed on every day of a time sequence that 
goes on forever and lands heads on infinitely many of these days. Given as 
background information that some coin is determined to be thus tossed, 
the probability of q* will be nearly 1. But on an Open Future view, it is 
impossible that the proposition q* ever be true. For, necessarily, on every 
day of every time sequence, q* is not true, since if q* were true, there would 
2Cf. Rhoda, “Probability, Truth, and The Openness of the Future.”
3And one really does need to work with tenseless propositions here. For what truth value 
the tensed proposition that the coin will land heads in five minutes will have is irrelevant to 
us. The truth value that this tensed proposition will have, for instance, in five minutes has 
to do with a potential toss in ten minutes, rather than the toss we care about, the one in five 
minutes. I take the use of “subsequently” by Rhoda (“Probability, Truth, and The Openness 
of the Future,” 199) to be such a tenseless claim, in light of his claims (“Probability, Truth, 
and The Openness of the Future,” 201) that once the events described in it have happened, 
it is true. 
4Chung, Course in Probability Theory, §5.4.
5But see Williamson, “How Probable is an Infinite Sequence of Heads?”
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be a fact about future contingents, namely that the coin will land heads 
infinitely often (whether the past tosses were heads or tails is irrelevant, as 
there were only finitely many past tosses).
One may worry that the scenario of an infinite number of coin tosses 
commits one to an actual infinite, contrary to the arguments of finitists like 
Craig.6 Talk of how many times the coin will land heads over an infinite 
makes it sound like there actually might be an infinite number of future 
heads tosses. However, the scenario can be formulated without any such 
worries. The claim that the future is infinite can be put like this: “Time is 
not circular, tomorrow there will be a day, and after every day there will 
be another day.” And, assuming this claim about an infinite future, the 
claim that the coin will land heads infinitely many times can be put like 
this: “There will be at least one heads landing, and some time after every 
heads landing there will be another heads landing.”
Thus, we have a conflict: the Law of Large Numbers tells us that q* is 
nearly certain, while Open Futurism tells us that q* cannot ever be true. 
We shouldn’t abandon the Law of Large Numbers. Probably the most 
philosophically vulnerable of our assumptions is that the future could be 
infinite. After all, there are many paradoxes of infinity.7 So the Open Fu-
turist’s best bet is to reject to the possibility of an infinite future.
But a Christian philosopher’s hope is for an eternal life in union with 
God. There are two ways of conceptualizing this eternal life. Either it is 
everlasting, in the sense that after every day (or some other unit during 
which the kinds of physical movements involved in flipping a coin can be 
made) there is another day and time is non-circular, or it is timeless. We 
may worry about the coherence of timelessness coming after a life, but, 
apart from that, the timeless option is highly implausible in light of the 
doctrine, so central to the New Testament and Christian tradition, of the 
resurrection of the body.8 Without time there can be no motion or change. 
But without motion, manipulative organs like arms and legs are pointless, 
and without change there is no exercise of sensory organs aimed at the 
reception of temporally sequenced data such as eyes (light is a wave, and 
waves are temporally sequenced) and ears.
While according to the Gospel narratives the resurrected Jesus is dif-
ficult to recognize as the same individual as prior to the resurrection, and 
our resurrected bodies may have many additional capabilities that we 
now have no idea of, the New Testament presents the resurrected Jesus as 
having a body with the kind of shape (e.g., John 20:27) and at least many of 
the same capabilities that we have—he can talk, walk, stand, break bread 
and eat fish (e.g., Luke 24:13–43). More generally, it seems there could not 
be any timeless functioning of a living body where “body” has the organic 
6E.g., Craig, Kalam Cosmological Argument.
7E.g., Benardete, Infinity.
8For an excellent discussion of the centrality of the resurrection of the body to Christian 
views of the afterlife, see Cullman, Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead?
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sense of the Greek word sôma (as opposed to the sense of “body” used in 
first-year physics9).
Perhaps a human body could exist in a timeless frozen state, but it 
would be a non-functional body, and such a state would not be a state of 
full human flourishing, nor would the doctrine that there is a resurrec-
tion of the body be of central importance to Christian hope then. But the 
resurrection of the body is crucial, so eternal life is everlasting—and hence 
infinite—rather than timeless.
So a Christian philosopher should not deny an infinite future. Hence a 
Christian philosopher should not believe in an Open Future.10
Baylor University
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